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SUMMARY OF REPLY BRIEF ARGUMENT 
In this Reply Brief, Appellant responds to Appellees' assertion that res judicata bars 
Appellant from seeking review of the Board's decision by the district court. Appellant asserts 
that res judicata and the recent Thorpe v. Washington City decision apply only if Appellant was 
subject to the appeal requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. Furthermore, the fact 
that the Board conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued "findings and conclusions" does 
not act as a bar under the "issue preclusion" branch of res judicata to a review of the findings 
and conclusions by the district court. 
Appellant next contends that the City Handbook does not clearly identify Appellant's 
position vis-a-vis Section 1106, and therefore, an issue of material fact remains as to whether 
Appellant is subject to the requirements of Section 1106. Furthermore, Appellant would not 
be required to "exhaust his administrative remedies" by appealing the Board's decision to the 
Utah Court of Appeals if he was not subject to the requirements of Section 1106. 
Next, Appellant argues that the Handbook's "clear and conspicuous" disclaimer of 
the formation of an employment contract does not necessarily bar Appellant from bringing a 
claim against the City for an actual failure to follow its own policies and procedures. An issue 
of fact remains as to whether the City followed its own internal policies and procedures. 
Thus, dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) was improper. 
Finally, Appellant concedes that he has not appealed the decision to dismiss his 
claims for defamation, slander and libel, tortuous interference with current and prospective 
economic relations, negligent infliction of emotional distress, quantum meruit, unjust 
enrichment and respondeat superior. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
1. Appellant's Claims are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
In their responsive Brief, Appellees present five separate arguments in support of 
their general position that Appellant's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Appellant will address each of those arguments in order. 
A. Res judicata does not prevent the appropriate court from reviewing an 
administrative decision. 
Appellant has no disagreement with Appellees' general analysis of the elements of res 
judicata or with the proposition that the doctrine applies to administrative determinations. 
[Brief of Appellees, pp. 15-16]. However with respect to the third element of res judicata 
analysis (that the issue in the first action must have been completely, fully and fairly 
litigated), Appellant does not agree with Appellees' characterization that the Board hearing 
was a "full evidentiary hearing" or that that the issues were "fully" litigated insofar as the 
City's administrative review process does not provide for the same level of discovery, inquiry 
or confrontation of witnesses as a standard civil action would. [Brief of Appellees, p. 16]. 
More significant, however, is Appellant's primary argument (which Appellees 
correctly summarize in their Brief): that the fourth prong of res judicata analysis (final 
judgment on the merits) is not met in this case if it is determined that Appellant was not 
subject to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 ("Section 1106"). As discussed in further detail 
hereinafter, Appellant asserts that he was not subject to the requirements of Section 1106 
because he falls within one of the exempt classifications established by the preceding Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 ("Section 1105"). 
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B. The Thorpe decision governs and res judicata applies only it"this Court 
determines that Appellant was subject to the requirements of Section 
1106. 
Appellees note that Appellant initially argued in his Docketing Statement the permissive 
nature of Section 1106, but has now shifted the focus to the argument that Appellant was 
exempted from Section 1106 in the wake of the recent case of Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 
UT App 297, 688 Utah Adv. Rep. 4. [Brief of Appellees, p. 17]. 
Appellees are entirely correct. However, Appellees also admit that the claim that 
Section 1106 does not apply to him was first asserted by Appellant at length in his 
Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [R. 290-92], and was directly addressed 
by the trial court in the Memorandum Decision. \K. 343-47]. Even if this legal point was not 
specifically referred to in the Docketing Statement, Appellant is not barred from raising it in his 
initial Brief. See e.g. Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Take City, 919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah, 
1996). There is nothing "awkward" or "curious" about Appellant's, decision to withdraw an 
argument when that argument has been mooted by this Court's intervening decision. In fact, 
failure to do so would suggest to this Court a lack of attention to relevant decisions handed 
down during the briefing period. 
The Thorpe decision becomes applicable as a bar to Appellant's claims, only if this 
Court determines that Appellant is subject to the appeals procedure in Section 1106. As 
argued in Section 2 of this Reply Brief (below), there is a reasonable argument that 
Appellant's job classification is one that is exempted by Section 1105 from the requirements 
of Section 1106. 
3 
C. Res judicata does not apply if Appellant is not subject to Section 1106 
despite the fact that Appellant obtained a hearing and final decision 
from the Board. 
Appellees next argue that Appellant received a "full evidentiary hearing before the 
Board." [Brief of Appellees, p. 18]. Appellees believe that because Appellant appealed 
termination and participated in the Board hearing, he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of 
the Board. Under Appellees' theory, Appellant would be required to appeal the Board's 
decision to this Court regardless of whether he was exempted from Section 1106 because 
there is no statutory authority permitting Appellant to seek review by the district court of the 
Board's decision. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 19-21]. 
Appellees cite to various cases in support of their argument that Appellee made a 
"general appearance" before the Board, thereby accepting the Board's jurisdiction over him. 
[Brief of Appellees, pp. 19-20]. However, all of the cases cited by Appellees concern an 
appearance before a "court." Appellee has provided no authority to support his contention 
that any person who appears before a municipal board (to object to or appeal any issue) 
immediately concedes personal jurisdiction or even subject matter jurisdiction. In 
Appellant's case, he appealed his termination to the Board as a precautionary measure. A 
party who takes an unnecessary and/or unwarranted legal step where the procedural process 
for appeal may not be entirely clear should not be penalized for taking such measures. 
Assuming arguendo that Appellant was not subject to Section 1106, Appellees still have not 
provided any direct authority in support of their claim that Appellant waived his right to 
review his initial termination by Pedersen to the district court just because he (mistakenly) 
sought review by the Board. 
Appellees' claim that there is no constitutional statutory authority to support appeal 
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from the Board to the district court and that this principal is supported by the Thorpe v. 
Washington City decision. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 20-21]. Appellees' application of this 
principal is supportable only if this Court were to find that Appellant was subject to the 
requirements of Section 1106 or alternatively, if he was not subject to Section 1106, that 
Appellant subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Board and was precluded from having 
the Board's decision reviewed by the district court. Because neither of these findings are 
legally sound, the entire point concerning the district court's inability to hear appeals from 
administrative boards is a non-issue. 
D. The Collins v. Sandy CityBd. of Adjustment case was based on entirely 
different facts to those presented in this appeal and does not apply. 
Appellees' final argument is based on language found in Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of 
Adjustment, 52 P.3d 1267 (Utah, 2002). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court denied the 
plaintiffs (the Collinses) the right to appeal an earlier judgment rendered by the Sandy City 
Board of Adjustment ("Sandy City Board") and upheld by the district court. Id. at f^ 19. The 
Collins court's denial was based on the fact that the Collinses had initially failed to appeal the 
district court's decision at the time it was made. The Collins court also reasoned that the 
Collinses effort to collaterally attack the earlier judgment through a subsequent appeal 
violated the doctrine of res judicata and state interests/public policy in seeing an "end to 
litigation." 
Appellees claim that the rationale relied upon by the Collins court should apply in the 
instant case. [Brief of Appellees, p. 23]. Appellant disagrees because the procedural and 
other legal issues presented in Collins are entirely different from those presented by the 
present appeal. Although lengthy, Appellant sets forth the facts in Collins with particularity in 
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order to highlight the unique set of facts in that case. 
In Collins, the Collinses owned certain real properties located in Sandy, Utah. They 
used these properties as short-term rentals until March 1996, when Sandy City ordered them 
to cease and desist such use. Sandy City claimed that the Collinses use violated local zoning 
ordinances. Id. at \ 3 The Collinses appealed the cease and desist order to the Sandy City 
Board, which ultimately upheld Sandy City's interpretation of the zoning ordinance. The 
Collinses then appealed the Sandy City Board's decision to the Third District Court, and the 
district court affirmed on September 29, 1997. The Collinses opted not to appeal that 
decision (hereinafter referred to as "Collins F). Id. at f^ 4 
Several months later, the Utah Court of Appeals decided Brown v. Sandy City Board of 
Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah CtApp. 1998) which involved precisely the same issue that 
was raised in the Collins case. In Brown, the Court of Appeals found that use of short-term 
leases was not prohibited by the zoning ordinance. Id. at f^ 5 In response to Brown, Sandy City 
imposed a temporary moratorium on short-term leases, which became effective on March 
27, 1998. Thereafter, Sandy City passed a permanent ordinance prohibiting all short-term 
leases in residential areas that were entered into after March 27, 1998. Id. at j^ 6 
On October 27, 1998, the Collinses filed an application for determination of non-
conforming use status on their properties with the Sandy City Board. Following a hearing on 
November 12, 1998, the Sandy Board denied the Collinses5 application. The Sandy City 
Board based its decision on two grounds. First, it concluded that the properties in question 
were not used as short-term rentals as of March 27, 1998 (i.e., the date the moratorium took 
effect). Second, it reasoned that the Collinses had previously appealed a decision of the 
Board, that this earlier decision had been upheld by the district court in Collins I, and that the 
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Collinses could not benefit from the recent Court of Appeals decision because they had not 
appealed the earlier district court ruling. Id. at f^ 7 
The Collinses then appealed the new Sandy City Board's decision to the district court 
(hereinafter referred to as "Collins IF). The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Board concluding that res judicata principles barred the Collinses' claim because they 
failed to appeal the district court's decision in Collins I. Additionally, the court found that the 
properties at issue did not qualify for non-conforming use status because the Collinses had 
failed to show that they were using the properties as short-term rentals on March 27, 1998. 
W. a t ! 8 
The Collinses subsequently appealed the district court's new decision in Collins II and 
the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals concluded that all of the 
requirements for issue preclusion had been met and that where a party chooses not to appeal 
an issue that has been previously litigated, that party may not avoid the effects of issue 
preclusion by relying on a subsequent change in the law resulting from an appellate decision. 
Id. at If 9 
The Collinses then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court, 
which was granted. On certiorari, the Collinses argued that the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that an intervening change in the law did not operate as a defense to the doctrine of 
issue preclusion. In addition, they argued that barring their suit did nothing to further the 
traditional purposes of issue preclusion. Id. at f^ 10 
The Utah Supreme Court ultimately concluded that no actual change in the zoning 
ordinances had occurred between the time the district court rendered its decision in Collins I 
and the time that the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Brown. The Utah Supreme Court 
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reasoned that while the district court and Court of Appeals had interpreted the zoning 
ordinances differently, this was not tantamount to an actual modification of the zoning 
ordinances themselves. Id. at f^ 10 
In addition to this legal conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court cited language from the 
United States Supreme Court decision in Federated Department Stores Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 
394, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981) on the matter of issue preclusion: 
an erroneous conclusion reached by the court in the first suit does not deprive 
the defendants in the second action of their right to rely upon the plea of res 
judicata.... A judgment merely voidable because based upon an erroneous view 
of the law is not open to collateral attack, but can be corrected by a direct 
review and not by bringing another action upon the same cause [of action]. 
We have observed that [the] indulgence of a contrary view would result in 
creating elements of uncertainty and confusion and in undermining the 
conclusive character of judgments, consequences which it was the very 
purpose of the doctrine of res judicata to avert. Id. at 398-99, 101 S.Ct. 2424 
(internal quotations, italics, and citations omitted). 
W. at 1| 18 
Based on this language, the Collins court determined that the Collinses made a 
calculated choice not to appeal the district court's decision in Collins I and could, therefore, 
not collaterally attack that judgment by filing the action in Collins II. Id. at f^ 19 
Clearly, there are significant factual and procedural differences between the instant 
case and the Collins case. First, unlike Appellant in the instant case, the Collinses did not 
challenge the Court of Appeals ruling that all four elements of issue preclusion had been 
met. Id. at Tf 12 Appellant has not conceded that issues heard by the Board were completely, 
fully, and fairly litigated. Appellant has also not conceded that the Board's decision resulted 
in a final judgment on the merits. 
Second, the Collinses chose not to appeal the district court decision because they 
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believed that the separate Brown ruling effectively protected their interests and that, 
accordingly, they could rely on that decision in seeking a variance. Appellant, however, did 
not appeal to this Court because he believed that: (1) an appeal to this Court was permissive 
in any case, and that (2) he was not required to by virtue of Section 1105. 
Third, the Collinses simply chose to abandon the appeals process. Appellant made no 
such choice, but appealed the Board's decision to the district court based on his 
understanding of Section 1105 and 1106. Unlike the Collinses, Appellant did not file a 
separate and new action to collaterally attack the decision of the Board. Even if Appellant 
was mistaken in seeking review of his termination by the Board because he was not subject 
to Section 1106, Appellees have not pointed to any case that would bind Appellant to the 
Board's decision and/or compel him to become subject to 1106 merely due to an error. 
Furthermore, even if Appellant made the incorrect choice of appealing his 
termination to the Board when he was not required to, Appellant does not lose his right to 
have the district court review the actual termination (as opposed to the Board's findings and 
conclusions) de novo. For these reasons, Collins is factually and legally inapposite to this case, 
and Appellant is not barred by issue preclusion from seeking review of his termination by 
the district court. 
2. The City Handbook does not clearly identify Appellant's position vis-a-vis 
Section 1106, and therefore, an issue of material fact remains as to whether 
Appellant is subject to the requirements of Section 1106. 
In his initial brief, Appellant argues that the City's Handbook's specific enumerated 
employment classifications do not clearly correspond to the classes of public employees 
exempted by Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 from the appeals process outlined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-1105. For this reason, Appellant contends that there was an issue of material 
9 
fact as to whether Appellant's position as a "Treasury Division Manager" could be 
considered a "head of a municipal department" or a "deputy head of a municipal 
department" as listed in Section 1105, and thus exempted from the appeals requirement in 
Section 1106. [Brief of Appellant Darwin Kocherhans, pp. 8-13]. 
Appellees' counter position is based upon several smaller arguments that can be 
summarized as follows: 
(1) According to the City Handbook (and Appellant's own admissions) Mr. 
Pedersen was a "Department Director." Appellant was a "Division Manager" 
who reported to a Department Director (Mr. Pedersen). The Handbook 
defines "Department Director" as "the individual designated as the 
administrative head of a department and designated as the Department 
Director for that department." [Brief of Appellees, p. 24], 
(2) Mr. Pedersen is an "Executive Management Employee," which type of 
employees (according to the Handbook)" serve at the pleasure of the City 
Manager," and "do not receive the grievance and appeals rights provided in 
these policies and procedures." [Brief of Appellees, p. 25]. 
(3) Appellant is a "Management Employee," which type of employee (according 
to the Handbook), is subject to the grievance and appeals rights set forth in 
the Handbook. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 25-26]. 
(4) The Handbook provides that "[o]nly full-time, part-time and supplemental 
probationary employees (as defined by City policy) shall have a right to appeal 
to the Board. Probationary employees, flexible employees, trainee employees, 
and executive management employees (as defined by City policy) are not 
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eligible to appeal to the board." [Brief of Appellees, p. 26]. \K. 39]. 
Based on these four points, Appellees conclude that the Handbook's categorization 
of employees and appeals policy and procedure are consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1105(2) and that there is no evidence to conclude that Appellant might be a "deputy of the 
head of a department" (which, other than a head of a municipal department, is the only 
other exempted class of employee in Section 1105 that could apply to Appellant). [Brief of 
Appellees, p. 27]. Appellees insist that nothing in the record establishes that Appellant might 
have been the head of a department or a "deputy head of a municipal department." [Brief of 
Appellees, p. 27]. 
The obvious weakness in Appellees' argument, however, is that it relies upon 
extrapolation and inference. In particular, Appellees' ultimate conclusion (as reiterated in the 
preceding paragraph) rests upon three assumptions: 
(1) the "head of a municipal department" as referenced in Section 1105 mustht 
synonymous with the "Department Director" as referenced in the Handbook 
and that no position in the Handbook other than a "Department Director" 
could possibly be deemed the "head of a municipal department;" 
(2) because the Handbook does not refer to or define any position as a "deputy of 
the head of a municipal department," such a position does not exist, nor could 
any position in the Handbook be considered a "deputy of the head of a 
municipal department. [Brief of Appellees, p. 27]; 
(3) that the "grievance and appeal procedures outlined in the Handbook" was 
enacted as part of the appellate process mandated by Section 1106 [Brief of 
Appellees, p. 25]. 
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Inasmuch as none of these ihree assumptions are directly supported by facts, it is 
impossible for Appellees to concretely establish its ultimate conclusion and equally 
impossible for the district court to rely upon these assumptions as the basis for granting 
dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Appellant performed various duties as Treasury 
Division Manager, many of which could be deemed as functions of a "head" of a 
department, or a deputy of a department head. Because the issue of Appellants' status as an 
exempt or non-exempt employee under Section 1105 was never considered by the Board, 
the district court should have denied Appellees' motion for dismissal on 12(b)(1) grounds 
and allowed this highly fact-based issue, to be further developed by the parties. 
3. Appellant would not be required to "exhaust his administrative remedies" by 
appealing the Board's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals if he was not 
subject to the requirements of Section 1106. 
Appellant does not dispute Appellees' general analysis of the legal concept of the 
"exhaustion of remedies." Appellant, furthermore, does not dispute that Sections 1105 and 
1106 establish a specific grievance procedure for non-exempt municipal employees by which 
employees may appeal a decision made by a municipality. Finally, Appellant does not 
disagree that the Thorpe v. Washington City opinion (which was rendered during the pendency 
of this appeal) affirms that a merit employee who challenges termination of his public 
employment to seek judicial review of such termination exclusively by appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing acknowledgements, Appellant's contention on appeal 
is that he was not subject to the appeals procedures mandated by Section 1106 ^he was 
exempted from those procedures under Section 1105 by virtue of the fact that he was either 
"a head of a municipal department" or "a deputy of a head of a municipal department." 
19 
Appellant has argued that there are unresolved issues of material fact with respect to the 
question of whether Appellant could be deemed "a head of a municipal department55 or "a 
deputy of a head of a municipal department" and that dismissal of Appellant's claim on 
jurisdictional grounds was premature. [See Section 2 of this Reply Brief and Section 1(b) of 
Appellant's initial Brief). If Appellant was not, in fact, required to appeal the Board's 
decision in this case because he was exempted by Section 1105, Appellees' argument that 
Appellant did not exhaust his administrative remedies is rendered moot. 
4. The Handbook's disclaimer does not indicate that Appellant's employment is 
"at-will" nor does the City's disclaimer as to liability for failure to follow its 
own internal policies and procedures automatically bar Appellant from 
bringing a claim against the City for actual failure to follow its own policies 
and procedures. 
In their Brief, Appellees first attempt to distinguish public and private employment 
agreements. Citing to Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991) (a case 
involving a private, at-will employee) and Cabanes v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, 232 P.3d 486 (a 
case involving a merit, public employee), Appellees suggest that a different standard for 
disclaimers of the formation of an employment contract apply in private and public 
employment cases. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 31-32]. In fact, neither Johnson nor Cabanes 
support such a position. 
As Appellees acknowledge, the Johnson Court held that the existence of an implied 
contract "turns on the objective manifestations of the parties" and that an express 
declaration against contractual liability can be a controlling, objective manifestation of the 
parties' intent. [Brief of Appellees, pp. 31-32]. However, additional points made by the 
Johnson Court are relevant to the instant case. As Appellant noted in its initial Brief, the 
Johnson Court distinguished between an employee who sues over whether he was an "at-will" 
13 
employee versus an employee who sues because the employer failed to follow its own 
internal policies and procedures. [Appellant's Brief, p. 16]. The Johnson Court (and 
particularly Justice Stewart's concurring opinion) affirmed that regardless of the clear and 
conspicuous disclaimer of an employment contract, the written policies and procedures of 
an employer can provide the basis for a breach of contract claim if the employer failed to 
follow its those policies and procedures. In such instances, the appropriate claim would be 
one for breach of contract, not a claim disputing at-will status. Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1003-04, 
1006. Appellant's Complaint alleges facts and an argument for a breach of contract claim for 
Appellees' failure to follow the City's own internal policies and procedures. Because an 
inquiry into whether the City followed its own policies and procedures in this case is fact-
sensitive, the trial court should not have granted dismissal prior to allowing Appellant the 
opportunity to conduct discovery on this matter. 
Cabaness in no way alters the general holdings of Johnson. Although Cabaness involved a 
public employee, the court in that case still considered the disclaimer language of the 
employment manual at issue and whether the municipal defendants' (Bountiful City and 
Bountiful City Power) policies and procedures created additional contractual obligations that 
were not disclaimed. In its analysis, the Cabaness court began its analysis of implied 
employment contracts with the general rule that "[a]n implied contract may arise from a 
variety of sources including personnel policies or provisions of an employment manual." 
C ^ ^ ^ , 2 0 1 0 U T 2 3 , T | 5 5 . 
The Cabaness court further explained that if an employee manual is deemed part of an 
employment contract, the terms should be considered terms of a unilateral contract that 
must meet the requirements for an offer of a unilateral contract. Id. at \ 55. Quoting the 
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Johnson case, the court reiterated: 
Under a unilateral contract analysis, an employer's promise of employment 
under certain terms and for an indefinite period constitutes both the terms of 
the employment contract and the employer's consideration for the 
employment contract. The employee's performance of service pursuant to the 
employer's offer constitutes both the employee's acceptance of the offer and 
the employee's consideration for the contract." Johnson v. Morion Thiokol, 818 
P.2d 997, 1001-02 (Utah 1991). Id. at If 55. 
The Cabaness court noted that the existence of an implied contract is normally a 
question of fact reserved for a jury because such an inquiry turns on the objective 
manifestations of the parties' intent. However, a trial court retains the power to decide 
whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable jury could find that an implied contract exists. If 
the evidence of intent relied on by the parties does not present any triable issues of fact, the 
trial court may also determine the existence or non-existence of an implied contract as a 
matter of law. Id. at f^ 56. Relevant evidence of the intent of the parties usually includes the 
language of the manual itself, the employer's course of conduct, and pertinent oral 
representations. Id. at f 57. 
The Cabaness court ultimately found that the employee manual "only disclaims 
contractual liability cwith respect to' a few specifically identified items" and that, therefore, 
the employee manual did not contain sufficiently broad and conspicuous language 
disclaiming any and all contractual liability.1 Id. at ^ 58. 
1
 The disclaimer contained in Section 101 of Bountiful City's employee manual entitled 
"Purpose of this Manual" provided that "[n]o contract exists between Bountiful City and its 
employees with respect to salary, salary ranges, movement within salary ranges, or employee 
benefits." Id. at f^ 58. The Cabaness court went so far as to conclude that "[ijndeed, the plain 
meaning of the disclaimer in this case is that Bountiful Power intended to create a contract 
with its employees with respect to the items in the Employee Manual that are not specifically 
listed in the disclaimer." Id. 
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In reaching this conclusion, the Cabaness court specifically distinguished the disclaimer 
language at issue in the Johnson case from language contained in Bountiful City's employee 
manual: 
In \Johnson\ we agreed with other jurisdictions and held, "a clear and 
conspicuous disclaimer, as a matter of law, prevents employee manuals or 
other like material from being considered as implied-in-fact contract terms." 
In that case, we held that "the manual ... at issue contain[ed] clear and 
conspicuous language disclaiming any contractual liability." Specifically, the 
disclaimer categorically stated that the manual did "not create a binding 
contract or any other obligation or liability on the company." Unlike the 
disclaimer in [Johnson], the disclaimer in this case does not contain broad and 
conspicuous language disclaiming any and all contractual liability. (Internal 
citations omitted). Id. 
In the instant case, Appellees focus on the foregoing language and argue that the 
prefatory language in Section 3 (Human Resource Policies) of the City's Handbook broadly 
and conspicuously disclaims any contractual liability arising from those policies and 
procedures outlined therein. [Brief of Appellees, p. 33]. According to Appellees, because 
Appellant has claimed a violation of those very policies and procedures, the framework of 
analysis in Cabaness (once applied) automatically bars Appellant from maintaining any claim 
arising out of an alleged failure of the City to follow its own policies and procedures. [Brief 
of Appellees, p. 33]. 
On first blush, the Cabaness decision appears to support Appellees' argument. 
However, two significant points serve to counter Appellees' argument. First, neither the 
Johnson nor the Cabaness decision distinguishes between public versus private employment in 
establishing an analytical framework for determining whether an implied contract exists. The 
two decisions are in accord as far as legal elements are concerned and the Cabaness court 
refers to and quotes the Johnson case throughout. 
1fi 
Second and more importantly, the Cabaness court was not required to answer one of 
the central questions addressed in Johnson: whether clear and conspicuous disclaimer 
language will shield an employer from a claim by the employee that the employer violated its 
own internal policies and procedures and thereby breached an implied contract. 
Because the court in Cabaness found the disclaimer language of Bountiful City's 
employee manual to be too narrowly drafted, the court allowed the employee's claims for a 
violation of policies and procedures to survive. The Cabaness court was not faced with a fact 
scenario where clear and conspicuous disclaimer language was used in the employee manual, 
but where the terminated employee brought a breach of implied contract claim based on 
allegations that the employer failed to follow its own policies and procedures. 
In Johnson, the court determined that the disclaimer language was suffkientiy clear and 
conspicuous to defeat Johnson's claim that he was not an "at-will" employee. However, the 
court clearly recognized that Johnson could h%vt challenged the termination notwithstanding the 
disclaimer language if he had articulated the claim as a failure by the employer to follow its own 
internal policies. Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1003. 
Interestingly, the disclaimer language in Johnson bears striking similarities to the 
disclaimer language at issue in the present case. The disclaimer language used in the 
handbook in Johnson indicated: "[t]his book is provided for general guidance only. The 
policies and procedures expressed in this book, as well as those in any other personnel 
materials that may be issued from time to time, do not create a binding contract or any other 
obligation or liability on the company. Your employment is for no set period and may be 
terminated without notice and at will at any time by you or the company. The company 
reserves the right to change these policies and procedures at any time for any reason." Id. at 
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1003. 
Section 3 (Human Resource Policies) of the City's Handbook reads: "[tjhis Human 
Resource Policies and Procedures Manual has been prepared to assist employees in clearly 
understanding the personnel practices of the City. The policies and procedures presented 
herein provide for the fair and orderly administration of the personnel system for the City of 
Orem. Nothing in this manual implies or is part of an employment contract." [R. 61]. 
The Johnson court recognized that a terminated employee could maintain a 
claim for breach of implied contract irrespective of broad and conspicuous disclaimer 
language (such as was used in the employee manual in that case). If this is true, 
Appellant has a right to bring a breach of implied contract claim based on the City's 
failure to follow its own policies and procedures set forth in the Handbook. 
In present case, Appellant has argued that even ifxhz trial court correctly determined 
that the language of the disclaimer in Section 3 (Human Resource Policies) of the City's 
Handbook was sufficiently broad, clear and conspicuous, Appellant's legal right to bring a 
claim against the City for failure to follow its own policies and procedures in terminating him 
(couched in the form of a claim for wrongful termination claim) survives a motion for 
dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because such a right is acknowledged in the Johnson 
opinion. The trial court erred by ignoring this legal right and improperly dismissing 
Appellant's claim for wrongful termination. 
5. An issue of fact remains as to whether the City followed its own internal 
policies and procedures; thus, dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) was 
improper. 
Appellees next argue that even //'this Court determines that Appellant has a right to 
maintain a claim for breach of implied contract based on the City's failure to follow its own 
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policies and procedures, the record establishes that the City fully complied with said policies 
and procedures, and therefore, Appellant's claim was properly dismissed on substantive 
factual grounds. [Brief of Appellees, p. 33-34]. The crux of Appellees' argument is that "the 
Board made numerous, specific factual findings regarding appellant's job deficiencies, his 
neglect of duty, the major error he engage in which 'harmed' the City and its employees as 
well as his 'serious violation of City policy' and then concluded that 'immediate termination 
was warranted.'" [Brief of Appellees, pp. 33-34]. 
Appellees make two additional points in support of their position. First, the 
Handbook allows the City discretion in determining which type of informal and/or formal 
disciplinary actions are most appropriate. [Brief of Appellees, p. 34]. [R. 44]. Second, the 
Handbook expressly provides that cc[n]othing contained in these Policies and Procedures 
shall preclude dismissal with or without pay effective immediately without prior notice and a 
hearing where the continued presence of the employee would present a hazard or disruption 
to employees, the public, or the City." [Brief of Appellees, p. 34]. [R. 230-34]. 
Before addressing these three arguments in order, Appellant reiterates the appellate 
standard of review when a trial court has granted of a motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6), an appellate court 
must accept the material allegations of the complaint as true. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah App.1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). The 
reviewing court is required to construe the facts in the complaint liberally and consider all 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs. St, Benedict's Dev, Co, v, St. Benedicts Rosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). A motion 
to dismiss is appropriate only where it clearly appears that the plaintiffs would not be 
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entided to relief under the facts alleged or under any set of facts they could prove to support 
their claim. Colman v. Utah State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). Because the 
propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, the reviewing court "give[s] the trial 
court's ruling no deference and reviewfs] it under a correctness standard." Anderson, 841 P.2d 
at 744 (quoting St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at 196). 
It is problematic that neither the Memorandum Decision [R. 333-51] nor the Order [R. 
352-54] issued by the trial court contain any analysis or discussion of whether the City 
followed its own policies and procedures in assessing Appellant's alleged errors, providing 
notice of those errors and reviewing Pedersen's decision to terminate Appellant's 
employment. In the Memorandum Decision, the section addressing the question of an implied 
contract focuses exclusively on the Johnson and Cabaness decisions and whether the City's 
disclaimer of the creation of an employment contract in the present case was sufficiently 
clear and conspicuous. [R. 340-43]. Because the trial court found that Section 3 (Human 
Resource Policies) of the Handbook contained appropriately clear and conspicuous 
disclaimer language barring Appellant's claim for wrongful termination, the court never 
determined whether Appellant's claim that the City failed to follow its own specific policies 
and procedures was sufficiendy supported by facts in the Complaint so as to avoid a 12(b)(6) 
dismissal. 
Because the trial court rendered no opinion or decision on this particular question, 
the issue is not situated for appellate review.2 However, if this Court decides to consider and 
2
 It is well setded that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground 
or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and 
this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, 
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weigh the arguments set forth in Part E of Appellees' Brief (i.e. that the City complied with 
its own policies and procedures in termination Appellant's employment), Appellant 
respectfully reminds the Court that the parties presented numerous facts and documents 
supporting and defending their respective positions at the trial court level as to whether the 
City complied with its policies and procedures.3 In other words, appellate review of this issue 
would be fact-intensive and would require this Court to draw inferences from the pleadings 
and exhibits supporting those pleadings. 
In undertaking a review of Appellees' argument that the City followed its own 
policies and procedures, this Court would be required to accept the material allegations of 
Appellant's Complaint as true and construe the facts in the Complaint liberally and consider all 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in a light most favorable to Appellant. 
The trial court's dismissal of Appellant's wrongful termination claim could only be affirmed 
was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court. 
Vipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, If 18, 29 P.3d 1225; Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, f 13, 52 P.3d 
1158. While appellate courts possess the authority to affirm on alternative grounds, they are 
not obligated to exercise this authority. O Connor v. Burningham, 2007 UT 58, ^ | 23, 165 P.3d 
1214. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has cautioned that it is a tool available only in 
limited circumstances and does not give appellate courts permission to search the record for 
alternate grounds to reverse a decision or pull from thin air alternate or novel legal theories 
with which to affirm decisions below. Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ^ J13 (n. 3). 
3
 For example, as an exhibit to the Complaint, Appellant provided copies of his employment 
evaluations demonstrating an extremely positive employment history and no indication of 
any recurring errors or problems. [R. 180-207]. In fact, the last evaluation issued on March 
23, 2008 (only six months prior to Pedersen's issuance of the Notice of Intent to Terminate 
Employment), contains a positive review of Appellant's performance. Pedersen (who actually 
prepared the March 23, 2008 evaluation) wrote that "Darwin [Appellant] is very 
conscientious in his work and doesn't do things in a sloppy manner in order to get it done. 
He doesn't accept it from his subordinates either." [R. 207]. Appellant also provided a copy 
of the Notice of Intent to Terminate Employment, which supports Appellant's argument that the 
main bases for termination were all related to incidents that took place over a two-week 
period in September. [R. 176-78]. Appellant's September 24, 2008 notice of intent to appeal 
Pedersen's decision contains a strong defense of Appellant's actions. [R. 174]. 
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if this Court were convinced that Appellant would not be entitled to relief under any set of 
facts he could prove to support his claim. 
Appellant has articulated facts supported by exhibits in the Complaint which (if true) 
could convince a fact-finder that the City did not follow its own policies and procedures in 
promptly terminating an 28-year employee without any opportunity to correct the alleged 
errors and who had received consistently positive employment reviews throughout his 
career. Based on the facts alleged in the Complaint and the exhibits supporting the Complaint^ 
Appellant contends that it would be extremely difficult for this Court to find that Appellant 
would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts he could prove to support his claim. 
Appellant now responds to the three arguments made by Appellees in support of 
their contention that the City properly complied with its policies and procedures. 
Appellees' first argument is that the Board made specific findings of fact concerning 
Appellant's job deficiencies, neglect of duty, and errors. Appellees propose that these 
findings support the Board's determination that Appellant's actions "harmed" the City and 
were so serious in nature that "immediate termination was warranted." [Brief of Appellees, 
p. 34]. \K. 230-34]. Appellees state that such findings are "binding" on the Appellant. [Brief 
of Appellees, p. 34]. Of course, this argument is circular in nature and is a prime example of 
"begging the question." The Board made negative findings against Appellant and then 
determined that immediate termination was warranted based on those negative findings; but 
a reviewing court could very well determine that those "findings" were mischaracterized, 
flawed or exaggerated, and that immediate termination was not a commensurate punishment 
for the mistakes made. Appellant is not precluded from challenging the findings and 
conclusions of the Board during judicial review merely because Appellees assert that those 
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findings and conclusions and conclusions are "binding." 
Appellees' second argument is that the Handbook allows the City full discretion in 
determining which type of formal or informal disciplinary actions are most appropriate. 
[Brief of Appellees, p. 34]. [R. 44]. While this is true, the next enumerated paragraph of the 
Handbook provides that "[disciplinary action shall be limited in severity commensurate with 
the infraction(s) in question and/or past infractions." [R. 44]. Although the City can 
determine which type of formal or informal disciplinary actions are most appropriate, those 
actions must be commensurate with the current or past infraction(s) and are "limited" in 
severity thereby. The thrust of Appellant's argument on this particular point has been that 
the City summarily terminated him after approximately twenty-eight years of employment 
during which he received continuously positive employment evaluations. The basis for 
termination was largely due to errors committed within a relatively short timeframe prior to 
termination (which errors were committed by other predecessors and employees). 
Furthermore, Appellant did not receive training for his position or any prior notice of any of 
the alleged "repeated" errors. The ultimate question is whether the City's decision to 
terminate Appellant without prior notice (given his period of tenure and highly positive 
performance history) was commensurate with the alleged infractions. This question can only 
be answered by reference to the facts alleged in Appellant's Complaint and the supporting 
exhibits attached thereto. A review of the Complaint and exhibits demonstrates that Appellant 
sufficiendy articulated facts that could arguably support his claim that his summary 
termination was not a commensurate punishment (particularly when Appellant's entire 
employment history, training, and performance evaluations are taken into account). 
Accordingly, this Court should find that the trial court's dismissal of Appellant's claims 
23 
under Rule 12(b)(6) was premature and erroneous. 
As to Appellees' third argument, Appellant concedes that the Handbook permits 
dismissal without prior notice and a hearing where "the continued presence of the employee 
would present a hazard or disruption to employees, the public, or the City." [R. 43]. While 
both Pedersen in the Notice of Intent to Terminate Employment and the Board in its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of haw and Order mention the "serious" nature of some of the alleged past 
mistakes, neither Pedersen nor the Board refer to the actual language of the Handbook or 
present facts showing that the "continued" presence of Appellant would present a hazard or 
disruption to employees, the public, or the City. The Notice of Intent to Terminate Employment 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofEaw and Order collectively refer to six specific events that 
could be deemed "mistakes" on the part of the Appellant. Three of the mistakes happened 
the same month Appellant was terminated (September, 2008); two of the mistakes happened 
in 2008, and the final mistake was not associated with a specific timeframe. [R. 177-78; 232-
33]. 
In his September 24, 2008 notice of intent to appeal Pedersen's decision, Appellant 
points to his positive employment record and the lack of training and lack of notice of earlier 
errors as an explanation for why the mistakes were made. [R. 174], Appellant never had the 
opportunity to prove whether his "continued" presence would present a hazard or 
disruption because he was promptly terminated effective September 18, 2008, without any 
chance to demonstrate that he had learned from his mistakes once they were brought to his 
attention. In sum, Pedersen and the Board did not meet the standard of showing that 
Appellant's presence would cause "continued" hazard or disruption once Appellant had 
been notified of the errors. Appellant was simply never given the chance to correct his 
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mistakes. 
6. Appellant agrees that he has not appealed the decision to dismiss his other 
claims. 
Appellant has chosen not to appeal the trial court's decision to dismiss his claims for 
defamation, slander and libel, tortuous interference with current and prospective economic 
relations, negligent infliction of emotional distress, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment and 
respondeat superior. Accordingly, the trial court's determination to dismiss those claims will 
stand. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in Appellant's initial Brief, Appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of Appellant's wrongful 
termination claim. 
Submitted this 21st day of March 2011. 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN, 
H E I D E M A N , MCKAY, HEUGLY & OLSEN, L.L.C., 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Darwin Kocherhans 
NOTICE CONCERNING ADDENDA 
Appellant notes that no additional addenda are included with this Reply Brief. 
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